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NATURALIZED PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE WITH A 
PLURALITY OF METHODS* 
DAVID STUMPtt 
Department of Philosophy 
University of San Francisco 
Naturalism implies unity of method-an application of the methods of science 
to the methodology of science itself and to value theory. Epistemological nat- 
uralists have tried to find a privileged discipline to be the methodological model 
of philosophy of science and epistemology. However, since science itself is not 
unitary, the use of one science as a model amounts to a reduction and distorts 
the philosophy of science just as badly as traditional philosophy of science dis- 
torted science, despite the fact that the central theme of naturalized philosophy 
of science is that methodology should be true to science as practiced. I argue 
that naturalized philosophy of science must apply a plurality of methods to epis- 
temological issues. 
Ever since the overthrow of logical positivism, philosophers of science 
have paid close attention to the history of science and to current scientific 
practice, and the use of evidence from case studies can now be taken for 
granted as central to studies of scientific methodology. Nonfoundation- 
alists have turned to naturalism to justify cognitive aims and the methods 
of science. The traditional model of science is that facts, methods and 
aims form a hierarchy. Methodology determines what counts as a fact 
and the basic aims of science determine (through philosophical analysis) 
what counts as proper methodology. This model leads to a kind of rel- 
ativism in the views of Popper and some of the Logical Positivists since 
they see aims and methods as conventional. Epistemological naturalists 
reject the hierarchy and attempt to avoid conventionalism by claiming that 
scientific facts can influence the choice of methods and aims. While nat- 
uralism exists in several forms, a general formulation will be adequate 
for the discussion here. Traditionalists hold that methodology is an au- 
tonomous, a priori disciple, while naturalists hold that methods and cog- 
nitive aims can be informed by scientific knowledge. 
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Naturalism implies unity of method-an application of the methods of 
science to the methodology of science itself and to value theory. Epis- 
temological naturalists have tried to find a privileged discipline to be the 
methodological model for epistemology, generally some version of psy- 
chology-behaviorist for Quine (1969), and cognitive for Alvin Goldman 
(1986). Naturalists in the philosophy of science have followed suit and 
attempted to reduce methodology to one metamethod. This metamethod 
might again be psychology, as for Ronald Giere (1988, 1989), history of 
science, as for Larry Laudan (1984, 1987), evolutionary biology, as for 
Donald Campbell (1974), or sociology, as in the work of Steve Fuller 
(1988).1 
Concurrent with the development of naturalized philosophy of science, 
a central theme of recent philosophy of science has become the view that 
the methods of science themselves are not unitary. This can be seen in 
Dudley Shapere's (1984) argument that science has developed into in- 
dependent domains; in the new philosophy of experiment advocated by 
Ian Hacking (1983) and Peter Galison (1987, 1988, 1989) in which ex- 
periment has a life of its own, independent of theory; in Arthur Fine's 
(1986) advocation of an antiessentialist view of science as a way of get- 
ting beyond debates over realism; in John Dupre's (1983) pluralistic meta- 
physics, and in Thomas Nickles's (1987) claim that scientists only con- 
cern themselves with domain specific methods. Indeed, in terms of 
institutional practice, philosophy of science has splintered into the phi- 
losophy of special sciences. One would think that naturalized philosophy 
of science would attempt to follow the breakup of science into domains 
in order to apply scientific methods to the philosophy of science, but this 
has not been the case. 
A tension which has been ignored by the proponents of naturalized 
philosophy of science has been introduced into their program. On the one 
hand, naturalism demands unified method. On the other hand, naturalism 
also demands that the philosophy of science be true to science as practiced 
and, pace the positivists, science itself has been shown not to be unified 
in its method. The point of getting beyond both the positivistic and Kuhnian 
analyses of science is precisely to avoid the claim that there is a single 
matrix in which theories, methods and aims are tightly connected. Nat- 
uralized philosophers of science have not gone nearly far enough in re- 
jecting these holistic schemes. 
With all due respect to Quine (1953), I suggest that there are two dog- 
mas of naturalized epistemology. The first is that there must be a privi- 
'Here I follow James Maffie (1990, n. 8). See Maffie (1990) for an excellent survey of 
recent work in naturalized epistemology. As the referee pointed out, it is ironic that the 
disciplines which the naturalists have decided to privilege in an attempt to be scientific 
about philosophy are held in low esteem as sciences. 
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leged science which will be the single model for metamethodology. The 
second, which I will only mention here, is acceptance of a strict 
fact/value distinction which makes normative claims about methodology 
impossible-accepting the "naturalistic fallacy" as real. Of course, the 
latter does not apply to all naturalists, notably Laudan. While the view 
that normative claims are only possible if one adopts a nonnaturalized 
position seems to be remarkably well entrenched; I think it is dangerously 
debilitating, since it leads immediately to a false dilemma. If the only 
avenue for grounding values and aims is a priori philosophical analysis, 
we must either hold onto the discredited apriorism or embrace relativism. 
In support of normative claims, I will only say that whatever one thinks 
about the status of ethical and aesthetical values, the idea that what we 
know cannot influence cognitive aims and values seems absurd (see Har- 
old Brown 1988 as well as Laudan 1987, 1990 for arguments in favor of 
normative naturalism and references to the current literature on this topic). 
Since science itself is not unitary, the attempt to privilege one scientific 
discipline as the method of naturalized philosophy of science has left nat- 
uralism as a form of reduction. When I say that epistemological natu- 
ralists reject the traditional hierarchical account of content, methods and 
aims, I take them to be committed to the view that the methods of phi- 
losophy of science are the same as those of science. While it is certainly 
true that we can distinguish different levels of analysis in the sense that 
the science of science is metalevel discourse about science rather than 
the object-level discourse of science, naturalism requires that the meth- 
odology of this metalevel discourse have the same status as the meth- 
odology of science. So, if there are many methods in science, then there 
must be many methods in philosophy of science as well. 
I do not want to argue that philosophy of science must use all of the 
methods of the sciences, for there may be one or several methods that 
are more appropriate for the philosophy of science. The point is rather 
that any method of science could be applicable in principle to the study 
of science. My worry about reduction is that some possibilities are ruled 
out, and this will lead to a distorted view of science. There are surely 
many stories to tell about science, and many different aspects of science 
require study. I do not see how, say, cognitive psychology could tell us 
everything that we need to know about science, or even how one could 
make the weaker claim that it is fundamental. The attempt to privilege 
one science as a model for philosophy of science shows that the natu- 
ralists share essentialism with the traditionalists. But the assumption that 
there is one unified scientific method that applies everywhere has been 
refuted.2 Furthermore, we have been given no reason to think that only 
21 have argued elsewhere (Stump 1991) that very weak methodologies which may seem 
to be universal are in fact too universal since they apply to nonscientific endeavors as well. 
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one method will be successful in philosophy of science, and using only 
one method where several may apply amounts to a reduction and distorts 
the philosophy of science by leaving out these other methods of inquiry. 
If one method turned out to be particularly successful in the philosophy 
of science, would that not give us good reason to use that method and 
no other? Perhaps, but I doubt strongly whether naturalized philosophy 
of science is now in a position to make such claims. 
To avoid misunderstanding, I should emphasize here that I am taking 
a critical stance on the methodology of philosophy of science. The plu- 
rality that I am advocating here is not intended to proclaim that anything 
goes in philosophy of science, as a naturalized Paul Feyerabend might. 
I reject the view that epistemology and methodology must be autonomous 
disciplines, and I do so on the basis of the failure of nonnaturalized ac- 
counts of science. Thus, I agree with naturalism and advocate testing 
methodologies for the philosophy of science much as we would test meth- 
odologies for science, and I expect that many methods in philosophy of 
science will turn out to be unproductive.3 
The naturalistic reduction to a single discipline not only distorts the 
philosophy of science in the same essentialist way in which traditional 
philosophy of science distorted science, it also leads to irrelevant dis- 
putes. For example, a recent science studies debate between naturalized 
philosophy of science and socialized philosophy of science was defined 
as a debate between overextended positivism and the salvation of human 
science (Woolgar 1989, Nickels 1989). I suggest that naturalists have no 
need for overextending their favored disciplines. If we deny the essen- 
tialist view of science and reject calls to reduce science studies to a priv- 
ileged disciple, then we do not need to worry about hegemony. Instead, 
cognitive science will have a role in science studies, as will the traditional 
humanistic disciplines. 
Naturalized philosophy of science can easily resolve the tension be- 
tween the demands for unity of method and for being true to science if 
the same plurality of method which is found in science is applied to stud- 
ies of methodology and of cognitive aims. In this way, we have a unity 
of method, but the method itself will be interpreted pluralistically. Tra- 
ditional philosophy of science has methodology autonomous and scien- 
tific method unified. Advocates of naturalized philosophy of science cor- 
rectly interpret methodology as part of scientific inquiry, but they have 
relied too heavily on single methodologies as models and have general- 
ized these models too far to be true to science. Besides raising problems 
of reduction, modeling the philosophy of science on a single science is 
3In Stump (1991), I argue that nonfoundational, naturalized accounts have the resources 
to provide objective judgements. 
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simply unjustified. The history of science, cognitive psychology, and so- 
cial factors all constrain philosophy of science just as they constrain sci- 
ence itself. It is time for naturalized philosophers of science to give up 
their dogmas. 
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